摘要
以基本的"收益共享契约"为基础,以集中控制型VMI&TPL模式为对象,研究供应链上游段各成员企业的协调。由于基本的收益共享契约不能对供应链进行有效协调,提出了基于风险共担的收益共享契约,但是该契约不能实现供应链各成员的期望收益的帕累托最优。为了改进这一缺陷,建立了基于不对称的Nash协商的风险共担型的收益共享契约模型。分析表明:该模型不仅克服了不能实现供应链各成员的期望收益达到帕累托最优的缺点,还可以实现各参与企业的期望收益的帕累托最优。
Based on revenue sharing （RS） contract, the coordination about upstream of the centralized VMI ＆ TPL supply chain is studied. Because the RS contract failure to coordinate the supply chain, an RS contract of risk-sharing is put forward. However, the contract cannot guarantee optimal Pareto of profit implementation about the member enterprises of supply chain. Finally, the contract is further extended to the RS contract of risk-sharing on basis of asymmetric Nash negotiation. Research shows that the contract can not only ensure the whole profit to achieve optimal Pareto, but it can also arrive at the optimal Pareto of revenue of all members.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2014年第6期83-88,94,共7页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA630174)
广西高等学校人文社会科学研究项目(SK13YB038)
