摘要
文章通过一个三阶段的非完全竞争市场的博弈框架,重点考察了在地方政府主导的体系中地方政府环境规制执行力度与腐败程度对吸引FDI流入的影响,并利用1998~2010年29个省市的面板数据加以验证,研究结果表明:外资企业确实将污染型企业转移至中国环境标准执行较低的地区,这一结果支持了“污染天堂假说”。此外,由于地方政府倾向于降低社会福利权重,从而加剧了腐败程度,造成“逐底竞赛”,导致资本错置。
This paper examines the impacts of environmental stringency and the degree of corruptibility on FDI inflows by using threestage game models. Five econometric models including pooled OLS,Fixed effect models,IV model,GLS model and GMM model are employed to provide empirical evidence for the theoretical predictions with provincial panel data from 1998 to 2010. The results show that inward FDI is attracted to lax environmental stringency in China. This provides empirical evidence for pollution haven hypotheses in China's context. In addition,the findings reveal that the soar of corruption results in inviting investments from overseas blindly. Several policy recommendations are addressed such as selecting environment-friendly foreign firms,increasing environmental stringency,and improving management system against corruption.
出处
《世界经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期112-119,129,共8页
World Economy Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(项目编号:12YJA790033)