不良贷款高企:形成机理与制度重构——以A市农信社为例

The Climbing Non-performing Loan: Mechanism and Institutional Reconstruction——Take Rural Credit Cooperative of A City as an Example

2003年启动的农信社改革成效明显,目前农信社系统整体不良贷款率处于合理区间。但部分农信社尽管采取了完善法人治理、不良贷款稀释等多种方式和手段,不良贷款率仍处于很高的水平。本文对A市农信社不良贷款形成机理、担保及担保创新的有效性、不良贷款稀释的负面效应等进行了分析,探讨了农信社信用放款的可行性,并针对贷款"合谋"行为提出了基于"双第一责任人"的制度重构思路。在当前银行信贷资产质量整体下滑的背景下,希望对于商业银行防范信贷风险、控制不良贷款上升有所裨益。

Achievements scored in 2003’s Rural Credit Cooperatives reform made the non-performing loans in a reasonable range,but the asset quality in some branches is instability. Although various methods including perfect corporate governance and dilute non-performing loans have been done, the rate of non-performing loans is still in a high level. In this paper,the formation mechanism of non-performing loans,the effectiveness of guarantee and the negative effects of non-performing loans dilution are analyzed;the feasibility of credit loan is discussed;and the institutional reconstruction thought of“double first responsibility person”is puts forward. The aim of this paper is to help commercial banks to control both credit risks and the rising non-performing loans in the current environment.