大型水利工程建设项目招标设计博弈模型分析

Analysis on Bidding Game Model of Large-scale Water Conservancy Project

我国是传统的水利大国,水利工程具有复杂性和不确定性,虽然已在初步设计阶段对工程进行了反复优化,但在招标设计阶段仍存在一定的优化空间。作为工程设计的重要阶段,招标设计的过程是业主与承包商相互博弈的过程,亦是业主对承包商进行激励的过程。本文在充分理解委托代理理论、激励理论以及博弈论思想的基础上,分析了招标设计的特点和承包商的需求,构建了业主与承包商的博弈模型。研究表明,设计一套合理的激励机制,不仅可以提高招标设计的质量,降低工程的交易费用,而且可以促进设计单位优化工程,提升工程的整体价值,具有一定的现实意义。

China is one of the traditional hydraulic power country. Considering the complexity and uncertainty of water conservancy projects, although optimization has been done during the preliminary design stage over and over, there is still some room for optimization in bidding design stage. It is well known, as an important stage of engineering design, bidding design process is a process of game between the owner and the contractor. Also it is the process for the owner to motivate the contractor. Based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory as well as the game theory, this paper analyzed these characteristics of bidding design and the demand of the contractor. Then game model between the owner and the contractor was constructed. Studies show that to design a set of reasonable incentive mechanism is very necessary. It not only could improve the quality of the bidding design which was helpful for lowering the transaction cost in the project, but also could promote the optimization level of engineering design which could enhance the overall value of the project. Therefore this study has a certain practical significance.