对赌协议在创业板的实践结果

The Practical Results of the Value Adjustment Mechanism in GEM

风险投资入资初创企业时,为了避免投资后创业者的投机行为,会在投资协议中与创业者签订各种约束条款,对赌协议就是其中比较常用的一种。尽管对赌协议是投资合同签订时各方真实意思的体现,但由于其触发往往在签约后1-2年,这样当达到约定的触发条件,需要执行时却引发了各种问题。文章在分析2009年9月至2012年9月创业板数据以及若干案例的基础上,探寻对赌协议这一约束机制为何在中国引发诸多问题,并试图找出对赌协议成功运作的机制。研究结果表明对赌协议对风险投资来说是有效的利益保护机制,一定程度上保证了创业者融资的及时性,但其成功履行也需要联合投资、分步投资和委派董事等多项措施的协同实施。

When venture capital invests startups, it will sign the investment contract, including many constraint conditions, with entrepreneurs and Value Adjustment Mechanism（VAM） is one type of them. Although VAM is the true representation of the two parties in signing the contract, it is often triggered after a year or two. When it reached the triggering condition, the implementation of the contract faced many problems. Based on the analysis of the GEM data from September 2009 to September 2012 and many relevant cases, the paper tries to explore the reasons why VAM causes many problems in China and find out the successful working mechanism of VAM. The results show that VAM is effective benefit protection mechanism for venture investment and guarantees the timeliness of the entrepreneurs＇ financing to a certain extent. However, the successful operation of VAM needs the cooperation of syndicated investment, staged investment and assignment of board members.