摘要
This paper investigates agency relationship composed by different risk preference between original equipment manufacturer（ OEM） and contract manufacturer（ CM）. The quality level of contractor CM has a significant influence to market demand,and also influences mutual benefits. To improve the level of quality,contractor has to pay the cost price and the effort,which are not observed and private information,so in this agency relationship there may exist adverse selection and moral hazard. OEM designs menu-driven contractual mechanisms to encourage contractor. In this contractual mechanism,contractor takes initiative to reveal its own effort cost information and maximize mutual profits. This paper set up Stackerlberg game model dominated by OEM,then it gives contract parameters through solving the model and it also analyzes property of incentive contract.
This paper investigates agency relationship composed by different risk preference between original equipment manufacturer（ OEM） and contract manufacturer（ CM）. The quality level of contractor CM has a significant influence to market demand,and also influences mutual benefits. To improve the level of quality,contractor has to pay the cost price and the effort,which are not observed and private information,so in this agency relationship there may exist adverse selection and moral hazard. OEM designs menu-driven contractual mechanisms to encourage contractor. In this contractual mechanism,contractor takes initiative to reveal its own effort cost information and maximize mutual profits. This paper set up Stackerlberg game model dominated by OEM,then it gives contract parameters through solving the model and it also analyzes property of incentive contract.
基金
supported by National Natural Science Fund(No.71172105)
