摘要
亚里士多德针对个体的存在区分了原始质料和最接近质料,并在事物本质的定义中将普遍质料包含其内。他既认为定义依托于个体的存在,又认为定义在认识上具有独立性。个体虽因其特殊性而不可被定义,但离个体最近的属定义可以表述个体本质,从而使得定义的普遍性与个体的特殊性之间形成了内在的张力。这种张力既突出了现实物相对于认识的优先性,又显示了定义在表述个体时的积极意义和局限性,而对不可言说的原始质料的强调则彰显了逻辑自身的边界及其根基之神秘。
Aristotle distinguishes between original matter and closest matter in individual existence, and defines that thing's essence contains the universal matter. He thinks that the definition is fuunded on the existence of individual and has its independence in cognition. The individual cannot be defined because of its particularity, but the definition of genus which is closest to individual can express its essence. Thus it leads to an internal tension between the individual and its definition. This tension not only highlights that the actual thing is prior to cognition, but also shows the positive meaning and limitation of the definition when it expresses the individual. His stress on original matter brings attention to the boundary of logic and the mystery of its foundation.
出处
《西南交通大学学报(社会科学版)》
2015年第1期92-98,共7页
Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)