公司治理与现金持有竞争效应——基于资本投资中介效应的实证研究

Corporate Governance and Competition Effect of Cash Holdings——An Empirical Study Based on the Mediating Effect of Capital Investment

本文以中国上市公司2003—2012年数据为样本,基于资本投资的中介效应视角检验了公司治理对现金持有竞争效应的影响。研究结果表明,公司现金持有具有竞争效应,资本投资在公司现金持有发挥其产品市场竞争优势中具有中介效应;更好的公司治理水平强化了现金持有通过资本投资实现的竞争效应,而且这种强化作用在潜在代理问题严重的公司中更为显著。进一步检验发现,公司治理水平与治理环境对现金持有竞争效应的影响是一种互补关系,而非替代关系。本文是结合公司治理对现金持有竞争效应问题的进一步拓展研究,为资本投资作为公司现金持有竞争效应的主要实现渠道提供了经验证据,在丰富与补充现金持有相关文献的同时,有助于全面理解现金持有竟争效应的生成机理。本文认为,公司在结合战略目标合理确定现金持有决策的基础上,只有治理环境的改善和公司治理机制的完善"齐头并进",才能更有效地解决公司代理问题,进而提升公司现金持有竞争效应。

Using the data from 2003 to 2012 of Chinese listed companies as samples, this paper empirically tests the corporate governance＇s impact on the competition effect of cash holdings basing on the mediating effect of capital investment. The results show that corporate cash holdings have competitive effect, and capital investment play an mediating role for corporate cash holdings to obtain product market competitive advantage. Corporate governance strengthens the competition effect of cash holdings achieved by capital investment, and the reinforcement is more significant in the companies with serious potential agency problems. Further tests, found that corporate governance and the governance environment on the effect of cash holdings competition is a complementary relationship, rather than the alternative. This paper is a further research of cash holdings competition effect combined with the corporate governance, provides empirical evidence for the capital investment as the main channel to realize the competition effect of corporate cash holdings, in rich and supplement the relevant research literature about cash holdings, at the same time, the paper is conducive to fully understand the generation mechanism of cash holdings competition effect. This paper suggests that, on the basis of the company makes reasonable cash holdings decisions combined with its strategic goals, only the improvement of the governance environment and the enhancement of the corporate governance mechanism ＂go hand in hand＂, can we more efficiently solve the agency problem and promote the competition effect of company cash holdings.