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股权激励、管理者过度自信与权益资本成本 被引量:4

Equity Incentive,Executive Overconfidence and the Cost of Equity Capital
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摘要 基于行为金融的视角,从管理者过度自信角度解释了我国股权激励计划实施效果不佳的困惑。实证结果表明,我国实施股权激励计划会在高管过度自信的条件下对上市公司权益资本成本产生影响:股权激励计划的实施提高了上市公司高管过度自信水平;股权激励与高管过度自信的相互作用使得上市公司权益资本成本显著升高。这意味着从管理者过度自信的角度考察股权激励对企业权益资本成本造成的影响,可能会更好地解释股权激励的价值效应。 Based on the behavioral finance,this paper explained the implementation of equity incentive plan in our country from the point of view of executive overconfidence.The empirical result showed that the implementation of equity incentive plan in our country had an impact on the cost of equity capital under the condition of executive overconfidence.The implementation of equity incentive plan raised the level of executive overconfidence.The interaction of equity incen-tive and executive overconfidence made a significant rise in the cost of equity capital of listed com-panies.This meant that our research on the impact of equity incentive to the cost of equity capital from the perspective of executive overconfidence,better explained the value of the equity incen-tive effect.
作者 雷霆 周嘉南
出处 《财经理论与实践》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第1期39-45,共7页 The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金重大项目(71090402) 国家自然科学基金(71371155)
关键词 股权激励 过度自信 权益资本成本 Equity incentive Executive overconfidence Cost of equity capital
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