摘要
以2001—2009年A股地方国有上市公司为样本,研究了官员晋升压力如何影响地方国企募资变更,以及这种影响在政府和企业资源配置下的差异。实证发现:官员晋升压力会导致更多的地方国企募资变更;在省区贷款投放越少或企业长期贷款较少时,官员晋升压力导致的募资变更概率更高。这表明,政府区域资本市场和企业内部资本市场的资源配置均会影响晋升压力对募资变更的作用。进一步研究发现:在市场化程度低的地区和市县级国企中,地方国企募资更易被政府区域资本市场影响。
By observing the data of local state-owned listed companies in the "A" share from the year 2001 to 2009, the em- pirical results indicate that: in order to purchase the promotion which based on the increase of GDP in the tenure of office, the promotion pressure significantly affects the orientation changes. When the province has less loan dropped and the company has less long-term loan, the promotion pressure will lead to more orientation changes. This indicates that the government of region- al capital markets and corporate internal capital markets will affect the promoted changes of pressure on fund-raising role. Fur- ther it is found that in areas with a high degree of market and provincial level SOEs, the impact will be stronger on the internal capital market; but in the areas with a low degree of market and the city/county level SOEs, the impact will be stronger in the government regional capital markets.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期93-104,共12页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71302181)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13XJC630001)
关键词
晋升压力
资源配置
地方国企募资变更
区域资本市场
内部资本市场
政府干预
企业融资
promotion pressure
resources allocation
change of collected money of local state-owned enterprises
orientationchange
regional capital markets
internal capital market
government intervention
enterprise financing