为戴维森的绝对真理论辩护——与江怡教授商榷

In Defence of Davidson's Theory of Absolute Truth——Consulting with Professor Jiang Yi

戴维森的绝对真理论有别于相对化的真理论,其中的真理谓词是一个未被定义的初始表达式,这种理论应当充当意义理论的普遍形式。江怡教授对该理论的否定性评判意见多有不实或不当之处:戴维森"意义倚重真理"的做法是源于他对意义理论的基本主张,他没有取消意义概念,因此无以形成"悖论";"真理概念的非定义性"并不表明戴维森无法讨论该概念和用它来建立一种自然语言的意义理论;"无指称的实在"是一种整体论的实在,并非"非经验性"的理论构造。该理论的基本观点还是可靠的,它们从语义学及其经验基底有力地说明了这种理论表征意义理论的理论可靠性和合法性,从而为戴维森纲领奠定了坚实的理论基础。

Davidson's theory of absolute truth differs from a relativized theory of truth,in such a theory,the truth predicate is a primitive expression undefined,and this theory should serve as general form of the theory of meaning. There are many aspects of falseness or inappropriateness in Professor Jiang Yi's negative judgments on the theory: Davidson's action of'meaning's reliance on truth'derives from his basic opinions about a theory of meaning,he doesn't cancel the concept of meaning,thus nothing can be used to produce'the paradox'; 'the undefinability of the concept of truth'doesn't show Davidson can't discuss the concept,and can't use it to build a theory of meaning for a natural language; 'reality without reference'is the reality in a holistic sense,not a theoretical construct with 'the unempirical nature'. The basic ideas of the theory are reliable.They have convincingly showed theoretical reliability and legitimacy for the theory to characterize a theory of meaning from semantics and its empirical base,thus set a firm theoretic foundation for Davidson's Program.