摘要
文章从地方政府与被规制企业政治均衡的视角,分析通过政治关联建立起来的政治均衡是否导致了地方环境质量的恶化。在考虑地方利益的前提下,构建了未发生环境事件的短期均衡、发生环境事件的短期均衡与长期均衡等三种情况下的政治均衡模型。通过数理推理的结论是,由于政治关联引发的政治均衡导致了地方环境质量的持续恶化。最后提出应在长远情况下切断政治关联的路径来减少政治均衡对地方环境质量的负面影响。
This paper, from the perspective of the political balance of the local government and the regulated enterprises, aims to prove whether the political balance established via the political connections results in the deterioration of the local environ- mental quality. It builds three political balance models at the premise of taking local interests into consideration: short-term balance model without environmental incident, short-term balance model and long-term balance model with environmental in- cident. Ttle conclusion is that the political balance caused by the political connections makes the continued deterioration of the local environmental quality through mathematical reasoning. Finally, the paper puts forward to reduce the negative effects of the political balance on the local environmental quality by cutting off the path of the political connections in the long run.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期41-46,共6页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102163)
中国博士后特别资助基金项目(2012T50529)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2011M500977)
关键词
地方政府
地方利益
政治关联
环境质量
local government
local interests
political connections
environmental quality