投资激励视角下农产品供应链治理结构优化

Governance Arrangement Optimization of the Agricultural Products Supply Chain from the Bilateral Investment Incentive Perspective

本研究针对"公司+农户"型供应链面临的双边投资意愿不足的现实困境,论文尝试在不对称纳什谈判博弈和Stacklberg博弈的框架下,分析"公司+合作社+农户"型农产品供应链提升双边投资意愿的理论依据,从而为农产品供应链的治理结构优化提出政策建议。数理模型分析显示:1与"公司+农户"型供应链相比,"公司+合作社+农户"型供应链中的农户种植投资和公司销售投资的意愿均能得到提升。2"公司+合作社+农户"型供应链的农户利润水平与合作社谈判力正相关;当合作社具有相对较强的谈判力时,即使合作社规定的资本留存率较高,农户利润水平依然能够高于"公司+农户"型供应链。3当合作社谈判力在某一特定范围内时,公司与农户利润水平均能实现Pareto改进。4当考虑到公司和农户进行长期合作时,"公司+合作社+农户"型供应链中确保农户履约的保证金阈值显著低于"公司+农户"型供应链。最后,利用数值仿真分析了合作社谈判能力、资本留存率等因素对公司与农户利润水平的影响以及农户保证金阈值的变化。论文研究结果表明,由于农户和公司在"公司+合作社+农户"型供应链中的地位更为平等,合作社能够形成对于公司的制衡力量,这大大降低了农户进行种植投资后可能面临的"敲竹杠"风险,农户的种植投资意愿得到提升。当农户加大种植投资后,合格农产品产量将会提高,这反过来又会激励公司提升销售投资意愿来获得更多的利润。因此,我国未来农业产业化经营模式的制度创新必须以农民专业合作社的壮大为基础,大力发展"公司+合作社+农户"型供应链,这不仅有助于更好地保障农产品质量安全;也有助于让农户平等参与现代化进程,共同分享现代化成果。

This study focuses on the realistic dilemma of bilateral investments deficiency in the ＇ leading firm plus farmer＇ mode supply chain and aims to analyze how to optimize governance arrangement of the agricultural products supply chain. In the framework of asymmetric Nash bargaining and Stacklberg game theory, the mathematical model is developed to capture the feasibility to increase the bilateral investments in the ＇ leading finn plus cooperative plus farmer＇ mode supply chain. The results show that ： ①Compared with the ＇leading firm plus farmer＇ mode supply chain, both the investments in the farmers＇ production effort and the enterprise＇ sales effort are increased in the ＇ leading firm plus cooperative plus farmer＇ mode supply chain. ②The profit level of farmers is positively correlated to the bargaining power of the cooperative. When the cooperative have a relatively strong bargaining power, the farmers can still have more profits even if the retention rate of capital requirements is high. ③When the bargaining power of the cooperative is in a certain degree, the profits of both the enterprise and the farmers will achieve the Pareto improvement. ④The farmer＇ s guarantee fund will become lower in the ＇ leading firm plus cooperative plus farmer＇ mode supply chain if considering the repeated games between the enterprise and the farmers. Finally, numerical simulations are used to analyze the impact, such as bargaining power and capital retention rate of cooperative, on the enterprise and farmer＇ profit levels and the change of farmer＇ s guarantee fund in two different kinds of supply chain. The results highlight an advantage of the ＇ leading firm plus cooperative plus farmer＇ mode supply chain ： by making the status of the farmer and the leading firm more equal, the ＇ hold up＇ risk will decrease when the farmer makes an investment. When the farmer＇ s willingness to invest becomes stronger, the leading firm may be encouraged to increase the investment level to make more profits. Thus, the priority should be given to the development of the ＇ leading firm plus cooperative plus farmer＇ mode supply chain in the future based on the cooperatives growing rapidly, which not only can help to protect the safety and quality of agricultural products and also may help make the farmers equally participate in the process of modernization and share with the modern achievements.