摘要
信息不对称和价格低弹性作为医疗服务的两大特性,是政府对公立医院行政管制的两大依据。文章重点分析信息不对称和价格低弹性两个假设的真实性,并探讨举办服务和行政管制推论的合理性,然后提出治理信息不对称和价格低弹性及医疗服务市场失灵的可行路径。
As the two characteristics of medical services ,information asymmetry and low price elasticity were the basis of administrative control on state-owned hospitals. The authenticity of hypothesis was analyzed. And the rationality of inferences of services and administrative control was discussed. Based on which, the feasible pathway to solve the problems of information asymmetry, low price elasticity and failure of medical service market was put forward.
出处
《中国卫生事业管理》
北大核心
2015年第1期48-50,共3页
Chinese Health Service Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"公立医院体制机制与医疗保险付费方式的适配性研究"(编号:13YJCZH271)
关键词
信息不对称
低价格弹性
公立医院
行政管制
逻辑关系
information asymmetry
low price elasticity
public hospitals
administrative control
logical relationship.
