中小股东异议的公司治理效应——来自审计师改聘议案的证据

The Governance Role of Minority Shareholders' Disapproval——Evidence from auditor switching proposals

在我国,当中小股东对公司重要议案投出反对或弃权票时,基本无法影响议案的通过结果;然而,由于中小股东异议在相当程度上反映了大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突,因此可能对其他市场主体产生影响。通过观察1996—2011年间1098例上市公司改聘会计师事务所议案的股东投票结果,发现对于改聘前收到不利审计意见的公司,中小股东异议的出现显著加强了公司在改聘后继续收到不利审计意见的概率,即后任审计师基于中小股东异议作出了更加谨慎的反应。这意味着即使中小股东"用手投票"无法改变议案的表决结果,但仍在一定程度上引发了外部监督力量的关注,从而发挥出间接的公司治理效应。

In China, when minority shareholders vote against or abstain from important governance proposals, proposals are often passed without being affected. However, due to minority shareholders＇ disapproval reflecting the agency conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders to a considerable extent, it may have an impact on other market participants. Using data from 1098 firm-year observations with votes on auditor switching proposals during 1996-2011, We find that the incidence of minority shareholders＇ disapproval significantly increases the probability of successor auditors＇ issuing modified audit opinions when the company had received a modified audit opinion prior to the audit firm switching proposal, which suggests that successor auditors respond to minority shareholders＇ disapproval in their reporting decision. The evidence implies that even though minority shareholders＇ voting by hand cannot change the voting outcome, it has the capacity to raise a third party＇s concerns, thus playing an indi- rect role in corporate governance.