合约实施效率会影响企业开放式创新吗——来自中国的经验证据

Does the Efficiency of Contract Enforcement Affect the Enterprises' Open Innovation?——Evidence from China

企业创新活动作为一种关系专用性投资行为,对合约实施制度具有较强的依赖性。通过构建不完全合约模型,分析了合约实施效率对企业开放式创新的微观影响机制,并结合我国微观企业的数据进行了实证分析。结果表明,合约实施效率对企业开放式创新具有显著的正向影响。在合约实施效率越高的地区,企业越有动力进行内源性创新投入。同时,较高的合约实施效率也会与外源性创新投入形成"互补",刺激外源性创新外溢效应的发挥,从而起到促进企业开放式创新产出增加的效果。本文的结论对于构建我国良好的法治环境,提高合约实施效率具有重要的启示意义。

The enterprises ＇ innovation has a strong dependence on the contract system as a relationship-specific investment. By con- structing an incomplete contract model, this paper analyzes the microscopic impact mechanism that the efficiency of contract enforcement has on the enterprises＇ open innovation. Based on this, the empirical analysis is done by using micro-enterprise data of China. The results show that the efficiency of contract enforcement has a significant positive impact on the enterprisea＇ open innovation. The higher is the effi- ciency of contract enforcement in an area, the stronger incentive has an enterprise to invest in endogenous innovation. At the same time, the higher efficiency of contract enforcement can play a ＂complementary＂ role in exogenous innovation inputs, which can stimulate the spillovers of exogenous innovation and thus promotes the enterprises＇ open innovation output. The conclusions have an important policy implication for constructing a favorable legal environment and improving the efficiency of contract enforcement.