特殊利益集团与转型国家制度变迁

Special Interest Groups and Institutional Changes in Transition Countries

本文从正式制度和非正式制度的互动出发,在一个正式模型框架下详细考察了转型国家的制度变迁特征。非正式制度和正式制度动态过程的特征存在差异,非正式制度的演变是渐进的连续过程,而正式制度不会频繁改变。适应于现行体制结构的有权势特殊利益集团通常会对正式制度的改变施加阻力。当非正式制度演变达到一定阀值,特殊利益集团结束对原有正式制度的坚持,从而发生迅速而剧烈的正式制度变迁。模型模拟结果表明:有权势特殊利益集团和本国其他社会基础状况都对转型国家制度变迁路径有重要影响,是转型国家改革过程中应关注的重点所在。

Based on the dynamic interaction of formal and informal institutions, this paper examines characteristics of institutional changes in the framework of a formal model of transition countries. There are differences between formal and informal institutional dynamic processes. The evolution of informal institutions is a gradual and continuous process, but formal institutional changes do not frequently happen. Powerful special interest groups will apply resistance to formal institutional change. When evolution of informal institutions reaches a certain threshold, special interest groups will give up the insistence on formal institutions, then formal institutional changes occur. Simulation results show that：powerful special interest groups and other social basis conditions have significant impacts on institutional change path in transition countries .