论福利机会的平等

A Critique of the Equality of Opportunity for Welfare

在当代关于平等主义的争论中,问题的焦点集中于"什么的平等",对此有两种基本的观点,即"福利平等"和"资源平等"。"福利平等"通常被认为有一个根本的缺点,即它是结果的平等,而合理的平等主义应该是机会的平等。因此,一些福利主义者试图对"福利平等"理论加以修正,使之能够包容机会平等的观念。阿内森就进行了这种努力,他把"福利平等"修正为一种新版的福利主义——"福利机会的平等",而且主张,它不仅是一种更合理的福利主义,而且也是一种更合理的平等主义。我们对这种平等理论及其两个构成要素(福利主义和机会平等)进行了深入的分析,而这些分析表明,这种新版的福利主义仍然存在着一些严重的困难。

The focus of controversies over contemporary equalitarianism is ＂what of equality＂. To the question, there are two basic conceptions, which are the equality of welfare and the equality of resource. The equality of welfare has a primary weakness that it is generally considered to be an equality of consequence, while a rational equalitarianism should be an equality of opportunity. So, some welfarists are going to revise ＂the equality of welfare＂ and make it contain the idea of equality of opportunity. Richard J. Arneson wants to do so. He makes ＂the equality of welfare＂ to be a new version of welfarism the equality of opportunity for welfare, and supposes that it not only is a rational welfarism, but also is a rational equalitarianism. We would analyse deeply the new version of welfarism and its two elements （welfarism and equality of opportunity）, and show that some serious problems remain to be solved for it.