基于演化博弈的企业知识产权保护与侵权研究

Research on Enterprise Intellectual Property Right Protection and Infringement based on Evolutionary Game Theory

在企业与政府有限理性的前提下,本文运用演化博弈方法构建企业与政府知识产权保护和侵权演化博弈模型,分析两类企业与政府均衡情况和策略选择,结果表明当政府的惩罚力度大于政策实施成本时,有限理性的政府会选择监管策略,此时企业是否会选择保护策略依赖于保护成本和侵权赔偿的大小;当政府的惩罚力度大于企业侵权收益时可以防止市场中的侵权行为,但此时企业可能选择搭便车行为,而不采取保护策略。

Given the bounded rationality, the article analyzes the market equilibriums and optimal strategy choice of governments and two types of enterprises by employing evolutionary game model. The results show that when the government＇ s punishment is greater than the cost of implementation, the government will choose regulatory strategy, but whether enterprises will choose protection strategy or not depends on the amount of protection cost and infringement compensation. When the government＇s punishment is greater than the revenue from infringement, the infringement behavior in the market can be prevented. However, at this time the intellectual property owners may choose the free - ride behavior strategy rather than the protection strategy.