基于网络直销可替代随机需求的供应链研究

Study on a Platform-selling Supply Chain Facing Random and Substitutable Demand

在网络直销背景下,研究一个电子零售商和两个制造商的供应链。电子零售商仅提供其网络平台并收取相应费用,制造商确定单个替代产品的价格和供货量,并借助网络平台发布产品价格信息供顾客选购。基于网络直销模式,针对产品可双向替代和面临随机需求的特点,采用加和的线性需求模型,在单个周期内构建一个两阶段主从博弈模型,讨论制造商的均衡最优定价、供货量和电子零售商的最优收益分享比例;借助数值实验,讨论替代系数和生产成本对制造商、电子零售商决策的影响。研究结果表明,在网络直销模式和终端随机需求环境下,当产品的单位供货成本既定时,产品相互替代度越大,电子零售商的收益分享比例和利润越大;当制造商产品相似替代系数既定时,单位供货成本越大,电子零售商的收益分享比例和利润越少。研究结果对于电子零售商提高利润和吸引更多的制造商直销产品以及制造商提高直销替代产品时的利润都具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。

This article investigates a supply chain consisting of two symmetric manufacturers and one e-retailer. Each manufactur- er offers one substitutable product and sells it through a platform owned by the e-retailer. The demand of these products is substi- tutable, price-sensitive and random. The e-retailer only provides the platform and charges a certain percentage of revenues from e-retail price of the product, which is referred to as percentage fees and commonly observed from the e-commerce. Each manu- facturer determines the market price and production quantity for his product before the demand met. The market price of each product is announced at the e-retailer＇s platform. Observing the information of each manufacturer from the e-retailer＇s platform, customers place orders via the platform. Manufacturers then deliver products directly to customers and obtain the net revenues de- ducted the agreed percentage fees. Manufacturers will bear an underage cost for each of the shortages when customers are not sat- isfied or bear an overage cost for each of the leftover inventory. We formulate these interactive decisions through a two - stage Stakelberg game. In the first stage, the e-retailer determines the percentage fee, taking the manufacturers＇ responses into consid- eration. Higher percentage fee can lead to higher market price and lower quantity. Low percentage may decrease the profit mar- gin. Therefore the e-retailer has to trade off these two effects. In the second stage, each manufacturer determines his production quantity and market price under the given percentage fee offered by the e-retailer. As the demand is substitutable, these manu- facturers are competitors and they have to carefully determine their market prices. Higher price will cause customers to other com- petitor＇s products. We derive the symmetric equilibrium market price and quantity under the given percentage fee. The determi- nation of the optimal percentage is also discussed in the article. Finally we conduct an extensive numerical study to investigate the effects of substitutability and costs on the optimal decisions and the performance of each party and the whole chain. We observe that the e-retailer charges a higher percentage and obtains a higher profit when the demand is more substitutable. When the man- ufaeturerg unit production cost is high, the e-retailer has to decrease the percentage and his profit is also decreased. Therefore, it is better for the e-retailer to offer product types with a strong substitutable feature as e-retailer prefers to choose competitive manufacturers. This indicates that the e-retailer may have a motivation to cooperate with manufacturers to decrease the costs un- der a proper contract. This article offers a practical and a theoretical guidance to e-retailers who rent their own platforms to manu- facturers.