论海德格尔《存在与时间》中的现象学概念

On Concept of Phenomenology in Heidegger's Being and Time

在《存在与时间》的"导论"部分,海德格尔认为厘清存在问题必须对存在论的历史进行解构。解构意味着我们已经对存在已经有了一个本真的理解。这种本真的理解海德格尔认为是通过现象学实现的。为了回答现象学何以如此?海德格尔探讨了现象和逻各斯这两个组成现象学的语词,并得出这样的结论:现象学的现象即是存在,故现象学是存在论;现象学的逻各斯是存在在此在的生存中的展开,故是此在的释学。

In the Introduction of Being and Time, Heidegger thinks that we must deconstruct the history of ontology for the sake of working out the question of Being. Deconstruction denotes we already have an authentic understanding about Being. We gain the authen- tic understanding, Heidegger thinks, by the method of phenomenology. But why can phenomenology do it？ To answer the question, Heidegger discusses the two phrases of phenomenon and logos which consist of the word phenomenology, and draws the conclusion： the phenomenon of phenomenology is Being, so phenomenology is ontology; the logos of phenomenology is the unfold of Being in the Das- ein＇s existence, so phenomenology is Dasein＇s hermernutics.