论重复囚徒困境博弈中的逻辑选择及其应用

Logical Choice of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Its Application

在重复囚徒困境博弈中,同样结构的博弈被反复地进行,参与者的最佳策略选择主要依赖于对手可能采取的策略和他们对抵赖和坦白如何作出选择。有限次重复博弈在决策行动时一般使用逆向归纳法,即从重复博弈的最后一个回合开始往前推理从而决定每一步的选择。在无限次重复博弈中,对于任何一个参与者的欺骗和违约行为,其他参与者总会有机会给予报复。

Since the game with same structure is carried out repeatedly in the repeated prisoner＇s dilem-ma game, the best strategy of participants mainly depends on the strategy that the opponent may adopt and their choice to denial and frank. Finite repeated game use generally backward induction in the decision-making ac-tion, namely from the last round of repeated game started forward reasoning to determine every step of the se-lection. In the repeated infinitely game, the other participants will have opportunity to give revenge for any one participant fraud and breach.