摘要
信息诱导最直接的作用是通过提供适当的交通信息来诱导出行者的路径选择行为。分析了信息诱导条件下出行者的路径选择行为的相互影响及其博弈关系,运用交通量、通行能力等参数量化了简单路网上随机配对的两个出行者的博弈收益。基于出行者有限理性的特性,建立了信息诱导条件下出行路径选择行为的演化博弈模型,并分析了演化稳定策略,在一定程度上揭示了信息诱导条件下出行者路径选择行为的时间演化规律,以及出行者群体行为的动态调整结果,为建立实用的诱导策略提供了一定的支持。
The most direct effect of information guidance is to provide traffic information to induce drivers" route choice behavior. This paper analyses the interaction between the drivers' route choice behavior and the relationship in game, and quantifies the game revenue of two randomly paired drivers who are on the simple road network. Based on the characteristics of drivers' bounded rationality, an evolutionary game model to route choice behavior is established in the paper. To some extent, the model reveals the regular pattern of time evolution of route choice behavior, and the result of dynamic adjustment to the drivers" group behavior. It provides some support for guidance strategy.
出处
《公路》
北大核心
2015年第1期108-113,共6页
Highway
关键词
信息诱导
出行路径选择行为
演化博弈
information guidance
route choice behavior
evolutionary game