控制权配置、投资者保护与投资效率——一个关于企业投资行为研究的综述

Allocation of the Control Rights,Investor Protection and Investment Efficiency:A Summarization on Corporate Investment Behavior

上市公司投资效率低下与广为诟病的投资者保护体制一直是困扰我国资本市场的两个顽疾,已有文献就这一现实问题展开了大量的研究。笔者沿袭控制权配置—公司投资行为及其效率—公司业绩这一公司内部治理机制逻辑展开,就控制权配置对公司投资决策的治理机制与外部投资者保护机制之间相互关系的研究成果进行了一个系统、全面的梳理和阐述。结果发现:尽管已有文献针对控制权配置、投资效率和投资者保护三者进行了大量的探讨,但仍存在研究内容展开不够深入和细致、研究结论存在较大争议等诸多不足之处,尤其是针对公司内部控制权配置的问题,包括在公司内部决策控制权和管理执行权在股东大会、董事会、监事会以及经理等高管团队中的均衡分配,从公司控制权内部配置模式研究和解读公司内部治理机制对公司资本配置效率的影响,以及依赖于这种配置模式背后的制度成因、影响因素和动态变化等规律的探讨尚未展开。而且,在此基础之上,深入探讨和解析这种公司内部治理模式与外部投资者保护机制之间的动态关系,也是今后研究需要继续深入之处。

Investor inefficiency in Listed Company and investor protection mechanism are two problems that always plagued Capital market in China. According to the internal mechanism of corporate governance, from allocation of the control rights to Investment efficiency and Enterprise Performance, this paper begins with a literature review about the relationship between governance mechanism of controlling power allocation to cor- porate investment decision, and investor protection. The result shows that although extensive studies on con- trolling power allocation, investment efficiency and investor protection have been performed, more intensive and precise works are necessary to clarify those controversial issues. Especially on the controlling power alloca- tion, extensive progress should to be made, such as the allocation of decision and governance power among the shareholder meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the top management team, the effects of firm governance mechanism on the efficiency of capital allocation, the systematic cause, influence factors and dynamic variation of the controlling power allocation, etc. Future works could also focus on the dynamic relation between firm internal governance mechanism and protection mechanism of external investors.