摘要
在18世纪的英国,趣味成为美学的一个核心概念,意指审美判断的特殊能力。休谟的美学同样是围绕趣味这一概念展开的,并且在新的哲学体系中,用情感和想象的规律阐述了趣味的内涵。然而,休谟由此也面临着与同时代美学家一样的问题,即趣味判断是否具有客观性。面对这个难题,休谟写出《趣味的标准》一文,其中他既坚持趣味的情感属性,又求助于理性,这导致他把趣味判断转化为理性认识或事实判断,最后把趣味的标准定义为正确的理性认识所需要的一系列品质。这虽然保证了趣味的客观性,但却背离了审美判断的本质。同时,休谟仅关注事实意义上的标准,忽略了价值意义上的标准,因而没有完全说明趣味差异的根源。不过,他的哲学仍然为弥补这些缺憾提供启发,即理性认识可以确定事实意义上的标准,情感可以解释价值意义上的标准。
In the eighteenth-century Britain, taste became a key concept in Aesthetics, by which it means the specific function of aesthetic judgment, and the special ability of aesthetic judgment. Hume, likewise, built his aesthetics on taste, and expounded in the new philosophic system the connotation of taste with rules of sentiment and imagination. However, Hume was faced with the same problem as his contemporaries, that is, whether taste judgment is objective. In the face of this problem, Hume composed an article Of the Standard of Taste, in which he insisted on emotion quality of taste, without falling short of reason, and this caused him to translate taste judgment into reasoning cognition or fact judgment, and finally to define the standard of taste as a series of qualities of reasoning cognition. Here, Hume ensured the objectivity of taste, but departed from the essence of aesthetic judgment. Meanwhile, Hume merely concentrated on the standard in the sense of the fact, but ignored that of value;as a result, he did not expound the original reasons for differences in taste. However, his philosophy could supply some inspirations for making up these defects, that is, rational cognition can determine the standard in the sense of the fact, and rules of sentiment can explain that of value.
出处
《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2015年第1期12-19,共8页
Journal of Central South University:Social Sciences
基金
国家社科基金青年项目"十八世纪英国美学学派研究"(11CZX073)
山西省青年学术带头人支持计划(2012)
关键词
休谟
《趣味的标准》
趣味
情感
理性
Hume
Of the Standard of Taste
taste
sentiment
rationality