摘要
公司的董事、监事和高级管理人员应当承担对公司的受信义务为现代公司法理论和各国实践所通认,但在现代公司财产所有权与经营管理权相分离、股东承担有限责任的背景下,股东对公司只承担有限的受信义务。在封闭公司中,少数股股东的投资、运作大多以信任为前提,多数股股东在对公司财产及少数股股东利益造成不当侵害时应承担相应的责任,不过多数股股东的这种受信义务应有合理的限制;同时,少数股股东在其能对公司决策产生重大影响时也对公司负有一定的受信义务。在对股东的受信义务进行法律规制时,过于苛刻和过于宽松都不利于公司的经营运作和资本市场的发展,因此法律规制要做到各方利益的平衡。
It is universally acknowledged by the theories of modern corporation laws and practices in various countries that directors,supervisors and senior executives of a company shall assume the fiduciary duty to the company. However,due to the separation of modern companies' property ownership and management right and because of shareholders' limited duty,shareholders only take limited fiduciary duty. In close companies,the minority shareholders' decisions on investment or capital management are mainly based on trust. The controlling shareholders have to take their fiduciary duty accordingly when they make improper infringement to corporate property and the benefit of the minority shareholders. But there should be a reasonable restriction on their fiduciary duty. On the other hand,the minority shareholders also take fiduciary duty when they can exert influence on the decision-making of the company. The legal regulations on shareholders' fiduciary duty should keep a balance among all parties' benefits;or else,they would go against the healthy operation and development of the company and capital market.
出处
《西南石油大学学报(社会科学版)》
2015年第1期62-68,共7页
Journal of Southwest Petroleum University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
封闭公司
多数股股东
少数股股东
受信义务
股东利益
公司利益
close corporation
controlling shareholders
minority shareholders
fiduciary duty
the interest of shareholders
the benefit of the company