摘要
本文全面揭示了政治关联这一非正式的制度安排对创业板公司上市后业绩变化影响的作用机制。研究发现,在控制了行业环境和公司本身经营特点等因素后,作为一种只在上市时才能发挥作用且相对更容易获取的外部关系,发审委联系并不会导致创业板公司上市后业绩恶化;而作为企业构建后将长期存在的一种关系资源,政治关联才是带来创业板公司上市后业绩变脸的重要因素。政治关联的负面效应进一步表现为:(1)有政治关联的公司更可能进行盈余管理,盈余管理的不可持续性导致了上市后的业绩变脸;(2)政治关联抑制了公司的研发投资,削弱了公司上市后的研发创新能力。本文的经验证据表明,在政府主导资源配置的市场环境下,政治关联会破坏企业的持续成长能力。
We study how political connection causes the change of performance of listed companies in GEM after IPO. Contrary to the insignificant impact of Issuance Examination Committee connection, we find that political connection, which is an informal but long-standing institutional arrangement, plays an important role in explaining the post-IPO performance change in GEM after controlling for industry environment and firms' operating characteristics. Further, the negative impacts of political connection can be shown : ( 1 ) Politically connected firms are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation whose unsustainability causes the post-IPO performance change;(2)Political connection inhibits firms' R&D investment and then weakens its post-IPO R&D innovation ability. We conclude that given a market with the government-oriented resources allocation, political connection is an important disincentive for firms' sustainable growth ability.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期132-144,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目(批准号:201493)
国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71103147
71273212)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(批准号:JBK130505
JBK1307206)的资助
关键词
创业板
业绩变脸
政治关联
发审委联系
Growth Enterprise Market
Performance Change
Political Connection
Issuance Examination Committee Connection