中国城镇化进程中社会冲突发生机理与过程分析

Analysis of the Mechanism and Process of Social Conflicts in China's Urbanization

城镇化的快速推进导致资源价值结构和经济机会水平发生了重大改变,模糊的制度规则未能及时、有效调整以反映新的资源价值和经济机会,争夺资源价值和经济机会的社会冲突频发,而地方政府的介入及其凭借强制力对资源价值和经济机会进行的策略性分配使得冲突变得更加复杂与剧烈。本文用简单的博弈论模型来展示城镇化利益分配的基本情境、利益分割中的不对等博弈以及谈判破裂后的抗争策略选择博弈,并在此基础上结合现实情境进行了延展分析。研究表明:关键行为者为获得城镇化利益而展开争夺,他们围绕城镇化利益分配存在着根本性利益冲突。通过利用制度规则模糊性提供的机会,地方政府和强势利益团体,在短期利益的驱动下,日益严重地侵犯农民等弱势群体的权利边界,利益攫取和成本转嫁越来越厉害。在城镇化的利益分割严重不对等和公共权利非均等覆盖的情况下,弱势群体也不愿意忍气吞声,运用"弱者的武器"进行抗争成为他们的理性选择。在制度规则形同虚设的情况下,现有体制鼓励了极端抗争行为和事件的发生,地方政府往往陷入越维越乱的维稳怪圈,社会冲突呈现出燃点低、爆点多、不断蔓延的特征。

The process of rapid urbanization in China makes the resources value structure and level of getting economic opportunities change tremendously. Vague institutional rules failed to adjust itself to reflect new resources value and economic opportunities, which result in frequent social conflicts in competition for resources value and economic opportunities. Whatever, the involvement of local government and its strategic allocation of resources value and economic opportunities makes the conflicts become more complex and intense. The study uses a simple game theoretical model to demonstrate the basic situation of interests＇ allocation, lopsided game of interests＇ segmentation and game of protest strategy selection after negotiations breakdown in the process of urbanization, and makes an extended analysis combined with the reality based on above analysis. Research shows that, key actors fight for the benefits of urbanization, and there is a fundamental conflict of interest between them around the interests＇ allocation. By using the opportunity provided by institutional vagueness, local government and other powerful interest groups driven by short-term interests, seriously and increasingly invade the rights boundary of fal^ners and other vulnerable groups, and benefits capture and cost transfer are getting worse. Under the situation of the seriously unfair split of urbanization＇s interests and non-parity coverage of public rights, vulnerable groups are not willing to submit to humiliation and it becomes their rational choice to wield ＇ weapons of the Weak＇ to fight. In such a case that institutional rules exist in name only, current system encourages extreme acts and events of resistance, local governments often fall into the vicious circle of stability maintenance, social conflicts is showing the characteristics of low burning point, more flashpoints and continuously spreading.