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外部环境变迁背景下中国家族企业的演化博弈——以聂氏、荣氏和冯氏家族为例的比较分析 被引量:5

Chinese Family Business Evolutionary Game under the External Environment Change:Comparative Analysis of Nie's,Rong's and Feng's Family
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摘要 "富不过三代"是国内外家族企业面临的共同问题,在中国这种现象尤为突出。本文在构建家族企业演化博弈理论基础上,划分中国家族企业类型,以近160年中国家族企业外部环境变迁为背景,对以聂氏家族为代表的未完全演化家族企业、以荣氏家族为代表的间断性完全演化家族企业和以冯氏家族为代表的连续性完全演化家族企业的演化博弈比较分析后得出,制度干预对中国家族企业发展的影响是巨大的,政治因素对于中国家族企业而言是柄"双刃剑",越依赖外部资源的家族企业,越不能经受环境变迁的考验。形成更多有利于家族企业发展的新认知模式,对于家族企业长期健康延续和传承有重要意义。 Family business has been common throughout the world, which made an enormous contribution to national economy as an irreplaceable role. Compared with the important contribution, "from rags to riches and back again in three generations" is the common problem must be faced to the most of family businesses; this problem is particularly acute in China. From a unique perspective of economic history research, combination of empirical and normative analysis, historical and comparative analysis, inductive and deductive analysis method. By constructing an evolutionary game analysis framework of family business, defining the relevant concepts, divided into three kinds of Chinese family businesses. Base on evolution analysis of Chinese family business in 160 years since modern times, research on in- complete evolution family businesses which represented by Nie' s ( in Nie' s family business, the games more hap- pened between Nie's family and the outside forces, which include political authorities and family extemal stakeholders. Although forming cognitive mode of familial change and politics rent-seek, as a representative of the incomplete evolution family business eventually march to its death) ; intermittent complete evolution family businesses which represented by Rong' s ( in Rong' s family business, the games mainly happened between Rong' s family and the outside forces, partly happened between Rong's family and the inside forces. Forming new cognitive mode of familial change , controlling right concentrate, politics rent-seek, and strategic shift; as a representative of the in- termittent complete evolution family businesses, had a discontinuity in the process of development process, but can still continue and development) ; continuity complete evolution family busine:sses which represented by Feng' s (in Feng' s family business, the games mainly happened between Feng' s family heirs and the inside forces, partly hap- pened between Feng' s family and the outside forces. Forming new cognitive mode of familial change, strategic shift, politics rent-seek, controlling right concentrate, and optimum inheritance ; as a representative of the continui- ty complete evolution family businesses, is being Continuity and inheritance healthy) ; which could get a conclu- sion. Institutional intervention has huge impact on the development of Chinese family businesses, it is vital for the development of Chinese family businesses to create a loose social environment without intervention. Politics factor is handle "double-edged sword", Chinese family business must keep a certain distance with political ruling power, if wanted to maintain a long-term and steady development; Chinese family business may proper use of political relationships, but never keep rely on it. The Chinese family business which more dependent on external resource, the more can't stand the test of the environmental change; which can search innovation from the family business internal mining, the better development. Base on the cognitive model of familial change, politics rent-seek, strategic shift, controlling right concentrate and optimum Inheritance, form more new cognitive model is conducive to rapid development of family business. It has important significance for family business long-term health development and inheritance. This paper creatively constructs the Chinese family business analysis model of external game or internal game, redraw the types of Chinese family business; forming a three phase representation of the history of Chinese family businesses, by teasing out the development course of Chinese family business since modern times. The formation stage of Chinese family businesses (1840--1926) , the unrest stage of Chinese family businesses (1927--1948) , and the twist stage of Chinese family businesses ( 1949--1997 ). The three stages of Chinese family businesses have experienced three more similar forms the "trough" to "crest" trajectory. Institutional factors lead to the three "trough", the first is the traditional social culture caused, the second is the period of the republic of China economic policy "compete with the people" as a result, the third occurred in the period of the founding of new China to the largest impact of Chinese family businesses. The first of the three "crest" in the late Qing dynasty, form naturally which driven by history; the second in the period from the republic of China to Anti-Japanese War, not fully expanded which because of the war of resistance ; the third is caused by institutional reasons after national consciousness awakening. Constructing an explanation framework of family business from the perspective of economic history research; provides the useful experience and enlightenment for the issues of Chinese family businesses continued.
作者 谢涛
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第2期53-64,共12页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词 环境变迁 中国家族企业 演化博弈 比较分析 environment change Chinese family business issues of Chinese family businesses continued. evolutionary game comparative analysis
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