资产互补性与专用性对农业垂直一体化的影响——基于5省378份企业与农户调查数据

Effect of asset complementarities and asset specificity on agricultural vertical integration: Based on 378 survey data of enterprises and peasant households from 5 provinces

从企业与农户双边资产互补性与专用性的视角,在GHM模型框架内分析了企业与农户在农业生产过程中垂直一体化的产生条件,并基于5个省份378份企业与农户的交易数据进行实证分析,结果表明:企业和农户的垂直一体化不由单方面资产专用性决定,而是由企业和农户双边资产专用性和资产互补性决定。企业或农户任何一方的资产专用性较低或企业和农户的资产互补程度较低,都会导致企业和农户最终以现货市场完成交易,这解释了中国"订单农业"履约率低的现象。当企业和农户双边资产专用性程度很高或资产互补性较高时,企业和农户会以反映双边关系的垂直一体化模式完成交易。

From the view of bilateral asset complementarities and asset specificity between enterprises and peasant households this paper analyzed the condition for the innovation of agricultural vertical integration based on GHM model, and it made an empirical study on the impact of asset complementarities and asset specificity on agricultural vertical integration by using the transaction data of 378 enterprises and peasant households from 5 provinces. The conclusion was that agricultural vertical integration was not affected by the unilateral asset specificity, but by lateral asset specificity and asset complementarities between enterprise and peasant households. The spot market would be chosen when unilateral asset specialty or lateral asset complementarities was low, which could be used to explain the phenomenon of low execution rate of contract farming. High lateral asset specialty and asset complementarities would result in agricultural vertical integration.