基于双重努力因素的供应链销量担保期权模型

Supply Chain Sale-Surety-Option Model Based on the Double Effort Factors

对于一个单期两级简单供应链,引入供应商的生产努力因素,并在需求随机并与供应商和销售商的努力水平相关的条件下,研究供应链节点企业的努力投入与供应链激励问题。为此,论文首先建立了基于销量担保期权的供应链契约模型,提供了一种基于期望损失的期权定价方法,分析了在该契约下供应商的生产努力和销售商的销售努力对供应链决策的影响。研究发现,在考虑努力因素时,由于努力投入的外部性,单纯的期权销量担保模型缺乏对节点企业努力行为的激励,无法实现供应链协调。为此,引入收益共享和努力成本共担策略,对原契约进行修正,当收益共享比例、努力成本共担比例满足一定条件时,修正契约可以实现供应链协调。最后,对论文的研究结论进行了拓展,并通过算例分析说明了研究结论的有效性。

The market demand will be affected when the supplier＇s production efforts are the same as the retailer＇s sales efforts. Under the condition that market demand is dependent on the efforts of suppliers and retailers,the efforts of node enterprises in supply chains can not only improve product demand,but also create new supply chain conflict. If incentive and supervision mechanisms are weak,it is difficult to achieve supply chain coordination with the supplier＇s production efforts and retailer＇s promotional efforts.In order to strengthen supply chain cooperation and enhance supply chain competitiveness,the supply chain needs a new mechanism that will be able to balance supply chain risk and return. In addition,the mechanism can motivate and coordinate the efforts input of node enterprises,improve the demand,and enhance cooperation. Under the condition that the efforts of supplier and retailer affect the market demand,we designed a sale-surety option mechanism in a single-period two-stage supply chain. The mechanism can coordinate supply chain decision-making behaviors,and balance node enterprise＇s risk and revenue.Firstly,we set up a quantization model based on the supply chain sale-surety option mechanism. In the model,option pricing mechanism is mainly based on the retailer＇s expected loss. Therefore,the sale-surety is higher,the expected loss is bigger,and the option price is higher. Sale-surety option ensures contract flexibility. Secondly,in the supply chain sale-surety option mechanism,an option pricing method is provided based on the expected loss. In the option pricing method,option price includes two parts： fixed price and guarantee of expected loss. The fixed fee is the entrance fee. The guarantee of expected loss is what the retailer may pay to the supplier. In addition,we have discussed the effort investment strategies,supplier production strategy,and supply chain coordination.At the same time,we have discussed the influence of the double effort factor on the decision of enterprises and supply chain cooperation. In order to improve the supply chain cooperation and encourage the retailer＇s and supplier＇s effort investment,we have provided mechanisms based on revenue sharing and effort cost sharing. We have shown that the mechanism can achieve supply chain cooperation. This study provides information on the revenue sharing and effort cost sharing proportion parameter,and the specific conditions that the parameter should be met.Finally,we have carried out the research from a simple supply chain to a complex supply chain with one retailer and multiple suppliers. In the expanded research,the paper provides an effort cost sharing mechanism. This paper examines supply chain cooperation problems with double effort factors from the sale-surety option perspective. The quantitative model enables us to derive the impact of double effort factors on supply chain cooperation,and some important conclusions. This paper provides valuable information for supply chain managers to make effective decisions.