基于信号博弈的我国上市公司股权激励分析

An Analysis of the Equity Incentive of Chinese Listed Companies Based on Signaling Game

股权激励作为一种制度创新在解决现代企业委托代理问题中起着非常重要的作用,同时股权激励方案的推出也起着向外部投资者传达企业内部经营信息以及经营目标的信号。在完善的资本市场条件下,股权激励方案的推出会导致分离均衡,而在不完善的资本市场条件下,股权激励方案的推出有可能成为噪音导致混同均衡。通过运用信号博弈模型来分析我国上市公司推出股权激励方案这一信号传递作用,进而为外部投资者、上市公司以及监管机构进行合理决策提供相应建议。

Equity incentive, as a kind of institutional innovation, plays a crucial role in solving problems in modern enterprises. Meanwhile, the launch of equity incentive plans also transmits principal - agent signals, such as inter- nal business information and business target to external investors. Under perfect capital market conditions, the launch of equity incentive plan will lead to isolated balance. Under imperfect capital market conditions, the launch of equity incentive plan may become ＂noise＂ and lead to mixed balance. In this paper, the signaling game model is used to analyze the signal transmission of equity incentive plan launched by our domestic listed companies and then provide corresponding suggestions for external investors, listed companies and supervisory institutions to make rea- sonable decision.