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水利水电类公司融资结构与公司绩效研究——基于2007~2013年面板数据的实证分析 被引量:2

Researches on Financing Structure and Performance of Water Conservancy and Hydropower Companies——Based on Panel Data Analysis from 2007 to 2013
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摘要 针对我国水利水电类上市公司2007~2013年的财务数据构建了面板数据模型,分析其融资结构与公司绩效之间的关系。研究发现,水利水电类公司的资产负债率与公司绩效存在显著的倒U型关系,债务融资的公司治理效应仅在较低的债务水平才明显;与通常理论相反,在水利水电行业与国家投资行为关系密切的现状下,水利水电类公司的国有股比例与公司绩效正相关;第一大股东持股比例和短期债务比例与公司绩效的关系不显著。 Using China's water conservancy and hydropower listed companies'2007~201 3 financial data,a panel data model is built to analyze the relationship between the financial structure and corporate performance.It is suggested that there is a significant U-shape relationship between debt-to-asset ratio and corporate performance;the governance effect of debt finan-cing appears apparently only when the debt-to-asset ratio is relatively low.Unlike suggested by common theories,the propor-tion of state-owned shares have a significant positive effect on corporate performance because of the strong relationship be-tween state investment and the water conservancy and hydropower industry.A significant correlation between corporate per-formance and the proportion of largest shareholder or the proportion of short term debt is supported by little evidence.
机构地区 河海大学商学院
出处 《世界科技研究与发展》 CSCD 2014年第6期715-720,共6页 World Sci-Tech R&D
基金 江苏沿海资源经济研究中心建设项目资助
关键词 水利水电类公司 融资结构 公司绩效 实证分析 公司治理 变截距模型 water conservancy and hydropower companies financing structure corporate performance empirical research corporate governance variable intercept model
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