财政分权、土地融资与中国的城市扩张--基于联立方程组计量模型的实证分析

Fiscal Decentralization,Land Financing and China's Urban Expansion—Evidence From Simultaneous Equations Econometric Models

中国地方政府倾向于选择土地融资的根源是1994年分税制改革后财权和事权的不匹配。在中国式财政分权制度背景下,地方政府通过土地融资进行基础设施建设、城市扩张"标尺竞争",形成了"财政分权-土地融资-城市扩张"的发展模式。文章据此构建联立方程组计量模型,利用1999—2010年我国省级面板数据进行实证分析和进一步的扩展讨论。研究表明,在财权上收、事权下放的财政分权制度下,地方政府为履行事权面临融资约束而将更多努力转向土地融资。作为经营城市土地的主体,地方政府之间展开竞争,结果是我国城市的高速空间扩张,而这种扩张又会对分权程度产生影响,同时存在地方政府支出结构扭曲、潜在风险积聚及土地城镇化与人口城镇化发展不协调等问题。

Chinese local governments trend to choose land financing. The root of this local government action is the mismatch between finance rights and responsibilities after tax sharing reform in 1994. Under the background of fiscal decentralization, local governments develop infrastructure and make city expansion＇ s ＂yardstick competition＂ by land financing, forming an ＂Fiscal Decentralization-Land Financing-City Expan- sion＂ pattern of development. We constructed simultaneous equations econometric models to do the empirical a- nalysis by using 1999--2010 Chinese provincial panel data and further expanded analysis is discussed. Our re- search shows that, in the system of public expenditure responsibilities decentralization and fiscal revenue cen- tralization, local government will shift more efforts to land financing to fulfill its responsibilities, facing finan- cing constraints. As main operators of land, the local governments start the competition, which resulted in the rapid spatial expansion of our city. And this expansion will affect the degree of decentralization. Local govern- ment expenditure structure distortions exist at the same time and the potential risk is accumulated. What＇ s worse, the development of land urbanization is not coordinated with the development of population urbanization.