管理层能力与资本投资效率研究--基于投资现金流敏感性的视角

Research on Managerial Ability and Capital Investment Efficiency:Based on the Perspective of Investment-cash Flow Sensitivity

一直以来,高层管理人员作为公司重要的人力资源备受关注,然而高层管理人员的管理能力对公司的资本投资效率有无影响和有什么样的影响一直缺乏实证研究。笔者以2003—2013年在沪深两市A股主板上市的制造业公司为研究样本,基于投资现金流敏感性的视角研究了高层管理者的能力与资本投资效率之间的关系。研究得出以下结论:样本公司中资本投资均对其内部现金流高度敏感,而管理能力高的高层管理者能有效减缓资本投资与内部现金流之间的敏感性。分组后进一步的研究表明:管理能力高的高层管理者不仅能有效降低融资约束导致的资本投资现金流敏感性,而且还能有效缓解代理冲突形成的资本投资现金流敏感性问题。本研究从一个新的视角证明:随着公司高层管理者能力的提高,管理者会越来越注重缓解信息的不对称性,通过缓和融资约束和代理冲突问题,可有效改善公司的资本投资效率。

All the time, corporation executives, as an important corporation human resources, are high profile. Up to this point, there were few empirical studies on the relationship between senior managers＇ ability and capital investment efficiency. Based on the Chinese a share mainboard listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2013, we study the relationship from the perspective of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Empirical result shows that capital investment are highly sensitive to the internal cash flow, and high ability executives effectively slow down the investment cash sensitivity in sample firms. Further study after grouping finds that high ability managers can not only effectively reduce the investment-cash sensitivity caused by financing constraints, but also effectively relieve the sensitivity caused by agency conflicts. From a new perspective, this study proves that, with the improvement of managerial capacity, corporation executives will increasingly focus on ease of information asymmetry and effectively improve the efficiency of capital invest- ment by alleviate financing constraints and agency conflicts.