摘要
《废弃电器电子产品处理基金征收使用管理办法》规定电器电子产品生产者应当履行基金缴纳义务,对处理企业给予定额补贴,通过构建政府和两个生产企业、一个垄断的处理企业组成的stackelberg博弈模型,得出政府社会福利最大时基金征收和补贴标准及其对利益相关者的影响。研究发现:(1)政府征收的基金受生产企业之间竞争程度的影响,在完全竞争时,社会福利最大时政府征收的基金等于企业给环境带来的负的外部性,社会福利最大时政府补贴高于不能回收处理的WEEE给环境带来的负的外部性;(2)政府征收基金会造成产品销售价格上升,销售量下降,消费者效用下降,生产企业将部分收费转嫁给消费者;(3)政府对处理企业补贴会使得处理企业愿意向消费者回购废弃电器电子产品时支付更高的价格,回购数量增加,消费者效用增加。
The Administrative Provisions on the Collection of the Fund for Disposing Waste Electrical and Electronic Products requires the electrical and electronic equipment manufacture should be levied on fund, and the disposal enterprise should be subsidized. The stackelberg game model consisting with the two manufactures and one disposal enterprise is established to conclude the fund and the subsidy, and then analyzes which influence the stake-holders. We can have the following results. The competition influences the fund of the social welfare maximizing, and the fund equals to the negative externality of manufactures causing to the environment under the perfect competition, and the subsidy is higher than the uncollected WEEE causing environmental negative externality. The regulator levies fund on the manufacturer, which can cause price rise and sale quantity, consumer utility, environmental pollution decrease,, and manufacture transfer fund partially to the consumer. The subsidy can cause the collected WEEE price, quantity, enterprise profit, consumer＇s utility rise.
出处
《生态经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期107-111,共5页
Ecological Economy
