基于合作博弈模型的民间标会风险生成机理研究

Study on the risk generation mechanism of ROSCA based on the cooperative game model

运用合作博弈模型,剖析民间标会风险的生成机理,构建分析标会风险的合作博弈模型框架,总结出标会风险主要来源于标会规模过大,标会利率过高,会员经济实力和社会声誉不足,会首组织能力和管理效率不佳以及法律制约和社会惩罚机制缺失等方面,以为实证研究标会风险提供理论依据,并为政府制定民间金融相关政策提供参考。

The cooperative game model is applied to analyze the generating reasons of the risk of ROSCA（ Rotating Savings and Credit Association）,and the frame of model is built to estimate the risk of ROSCA. It is concluded that the risk of ROSCA is caused by excessively large scale and high interest rate,deficient members’ economic strength and social reputation,directors’ low organizing ability and management efficiency,and the lack of legal rules and social punishment system. This study means to offer a theoretical basis for the further empirical research on the risk of ROSCA,and to provide reference for the government to formulate relevant policies of folk finance.