博弈均衡下的可疑交易报告制度设计和监管

Suspicious Transaction Report Mechanism Design and Its Supervision in Game Equilibrium

反洗钱可疑交易报告制度的有效性,是理论界、国际组织以及世界各国致力于研究和解决的重大课题,也是制约我国当前反洗钱工作效率的现实难题。本文通过研究可疑交易报告机制的信息结构和监管博弈,建立数理模型,证明在缺乏洗钱风险信息沟通情况下,可疑交易报告机制的纯策略静态博弈是趋于无效的,并以动态博弈完美纳什均衡为条件,证明以风险为本的方法可解决可疑交易报告制度的有效性难题,研究了这一方法下的金融机构参与性约束条件和监管机制设计等问题,并对我国反洗钱体制改革和转型提出政策建议。

The effectiveness of anti-money laundering suspicious transaction report （STR） mechanism, is an important theoretical issue to be studied and solving by theorists, international organizations and other countries, but also a practical problem faced by our country. To prove and study whether and how to realize the effectiveness of STR system, we construct a signaling game model, and prove that STR mechanism could come to inefficient without mon- ey laundering risk information communication. Based on perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic game, we prove it could come to efficient to use risk-based approach, and study the participatory constraint and incentive compatible regulation mechanism and other issues. The study and conclusions of this paper have certain theoretical reference and practical val- ue for restructuring and transformation of our anti-money laundering system.