管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系——基于动态内生性的经验研究被引量：7

The Relationship Between Managerial Compensation Incentives and Corporate Risk-taking——Based on the Empirical Studies of Dynamic Endogeneity

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摘要本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现:管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题,不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外,前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。 In this paper, 716 listed companies range from 2002 to 2011 are used as our sample. In the framework of dynamic endogeneity, we use the dynamic System GMM model, based on a dynamic perspective to study the rela- tionship between managerial compensation incentives and corporate risk-taking. And we get the following results： There is dynamic endogeneity problem between managerial compensation and corporate risk-taking, not only current managerial compensation incentives has a significant effect on the corporate risk-taking, but also previous managerial compensation incentives has a significant effect on the corporate risk-taking, and two kinds of compensation incentives has a contrary effect on the corporate risk-taking. Besides, previous corporate risk-taking has a feedback effects on cur- rent managerial compensation.

作者石大林

机构地区华夏幸福基业股份有限公司总部财务中心

出处《金融发展研究》北大核心 2015年第1期17-25,共9页 Journal Of Financial Development Research

关键词管理层持股比例管理层货币薪酬公司风险承担动态内生性 managerial ownership, managerial monetary compensation, corporate risk-taking, dynamic endogeneity

分类号 F830 [经济管理—金融学]

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