广告代理商的最优拍卖机制

Optimal Auction Mechanism of Advertising Agency

从广告代理商的角度设计一个关键词广告的最优拍卖机制,给出了拍卖机制激励相容的充要条件。提出新的分配规则——截断正相称分配规则,并给出最优支付规则。与传统的VCG机制进行比较后发现,当所有广告主均为对称时,该最优拍卖机制的分配规则、支付规则和收益均与VCG机制相同,即为有效率。此外还基于信息距离理论和拍卖机制的总收益给出两种广告投放效率的度量方法。

A keyword advertising optimal auction mechanism is given from the perspective of an advertising agency. Neeessa- ry and sufficient conditions are provided that ensure the optinral auction mechanism is incentive compatible. Both a new allo- cation rule--truncated positive assortative allocation rule and an optimal payment rule are proposed. Furthermore, the opti- mal auction mechanism is compared with the traditional VCG mechanism. When all the advertisers are symmetric, it has the same allocation rule, payment rule and profit with VCG mechanism, that is to say the mechanism is efficient. In addition, two ways are also given to measure the advertising launching efficiency based on the distance of information-state transition theory and the auction profit.