摘要
本文以2006-2011年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,基于利益冲突视角研究了上市公司业绩预告是否会影响分析师的预测修正行为及预测修正误差,并运用完全信息动态博弈理论从利益诱导和利益冲突回避两个角度分析了利益冲突机制在这种影响中的作用。研究发现:(1)上市公司业绩预告与分析师预测修正行为之间显著正相关,且此关系在熊市更为显著,但这一关系受到利益冲突机制的限制;(2)上市公司业绩预告与分析师预测修正误差之间显著负相关,但此关系在牛熊市之间并无显著差异,且利益冲突机制抑制了这种关系。
Using a large sample of A-share listed companies in SSE and SZSE for the period 2006 to 2011, we document the relationship between Earnings forecasts of listed company and analyst forecast revisions from conflicts of interest perspective. Then, we introduce the dynamic game theory of complete information to investigate how conflicts of interest affect the relationship from two aspects: the interest incentive and the avoidance of interest conflicts. According to the empirical research, we find that earnings forecasts of listed company are strongly and positively associated with analyst forecasts revisions, especially in the bear market. But this relationship is subject to the conflicts of interest. We also find that earnings forecasts are strongly and negatively associated with analyst forecast revisions, but there are no significant differences between bull and bear market. And the relationship is subject to the conflicts of interest.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期24-31,共8页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“全球金融风暴背景下中国企业财务决策行为研究”(70972110)资助
关键词
利益冲突机制
利益冲突回避效应
上市公司业绩预告
分析师预测修正
conflicts of interest mechanism, incentive and avoidance of conflicts of interests ,earnings forecasts, analystforecast revisions