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高管薪酬激励对企业价值创造的影响研究 被引量:5

The Impact of Management Incentive Scheme upon Future Value Creation
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摘要 本文首次运用公司未来的创值水平作为评估激励效果的指标,运用利润与现金薪酬的相关系数衡量现金激励水平,比较了权益激励、现金激励和未安排激励情况下公司的未来创值水平。实证结果表明:(1)高管的现金薪酬越高,企业的未来创值水平越高;(2)安排现金激励的公司未来创值水平比未安排激励的公司高;(3)安排权益激励的公司未来创值水平比安排现金激励和未安排激励的公司都高,这在国有上市公司中尤其显著。总体来讲,在薪酬管理实务中,安排权益激励的合约优于安排现金激励的合约,安排现金激励的合约优于未安排激励的合约,高薪的合约优于低薪的合约,高薪的管理者能够给股东创造财富。 This paper suggests via theoretical analysis that good human capital management for top-managers should be high salaries and incentive arrangements. The empirical tests support this point of view based on a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange before 2008. The empirical results show that (1) there is positive relationship between the level of top-managers' pay and the level of future value-creating, (2) the sensitivity of firms' future value-creating to compensation for firms which have arranged cash-based incentive compensation system to top-managers is significantly higher than that for firms which do not arrange incentive compensation system to top-managers, (3) the sensitivity of future value- creating to compensation for firms which arrange equity-based incentive compensation system to top-managers is significantly higher than that for firms which only arrange cash-based incentive system to top-managers or do not arrange incentive system at all. Overall, in the practices of human capital management, the contracts with equity-based incentive are better than those with cash-based incentive, and the contracts with cash-based incentive are better than those without incentive system, contracts paid higher are better than low-paid contracts.
机构地区 南京大学商学院
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第2期32-37,共6页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(项目号71372029)
关键词 现金激励 权益激励 未来创值 高管激励 cash-based incentive, equity-based incentive, future value creation
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