管理者过度自信、公司治理与过度投资行为

Managerial Overconfidence,Corporate Governance and Over-investment Behavior

本文以2010-2013年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理者过度自信对公司投资行为的影响,结果表明:管理者过度自信导致公司过度投资;股权集中度和股权制衡度的提高不仅不能缓解公司的过度投资行为,反而还会加剧公司的过度投资行为;提高独立董事的比例可以适当缓解公司的过度投资行为。这些经验证据从侧面证实了管理者过度自信导致过度投资更多的是心理层面的问题,最佳的治理措施是引入独立董事等观点,不能简单对其进行激励和监督。

We take the companies listed in Chinese A shares as samples,and study the investment behavior of overconfident management from 2010 to 2013 under different corporate governance structures.We find that overconfident management are more likely over-investment;increasing the ownership concentration ratio and ownership balancing ratio can not help them alleviate the problem,but aggravate their over-investment behavior;increasing the ratio of independent directors can alleviate the over-investment problem somewhat.This empirical evidence also proved that the over-investment problem of overconfident management is less likely a moral problem,but more likely a psychological problem.The best control measure for the problem is not to stimulate the management or supervise their work,but to introduce more outsiders' viewpoints from the people such as independent directors.