公共部门激励扭曲的形成及测量

Distortion of Public Sector Incentive and its measurement

公共部门的产出结果难以观测、多任务、多委托人、以及内在激励型代理人等特征与激励扭曲的形成密不可分,都可能导致代理人行为结果偏离委托人的期望目标。公共部门激励扭曲程度可以采用Baker模型的向量夹角表示法进行具体的测量操作步骤设计,本文以福建某市的街道办事处为测量对象,演示该算法在我国公共部门测量中的实际操作方法。

Multitask, muhiprincipal, unobservable output and Motivated Agents of Public Sector will result in the departure from the agent＇ s behavioral result to the principal＇ s expectation. The measurement of incentive distortion is an urgent problem, one of which is derive from performance assessment and is ubiquitous in public sector practice. This paper discusses the computing problem and operable procedure of angle θ in Baker＇ s model. It provides the theoretical basis for empirical study of public sector incentive distortion.