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高阶理论对现象性意识的物理主义解释之困难

Difficulty of Physicalism-based Interpretation of Phenomenal Consciousness Using Higher-order Theory
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摘要 现象性意识是实实在在的、无法脱离主观视角的体验,且难以从完全客观的视角来理解,由此构成所谓意识之谜。高阶理论试图吸取传统思想资源解决意识问题。该理论认为意识状态在于低阶心理状态为一个与之不同的高阶心理状态所表征,并由此得出意识的个体化条件。此外,该理论还试图对意识给予物理主义的还原性说明。然而,高阶理论及其主要变种都面临诸多困难,更为重要的是,高阶理论对现象性意识进行物理主义的还原性解释是不成功的。物理主义的说明无法处理意识的"跨形而上学场景同质性",而且因为意识是源初的现象,也无法对其给予还原性的说明,而只能如斯特劳森所说,在整体性的阐明中得到理解。 The phenomenal consciousness is an experience that is real and can not escape the subjective perspective, and it is difficult to interpret it from a completely objective perspective, resulting in the so-called mystery of consciousness. The higher-order theory attempts to distill essence from the traditional ideological resources to solve the issues of consciousness. This theory holds that the conscious the state of consciousness is the representation of a lower-order mental state by a different higher-order mental state, thus arrives at the conclusion of the individualized conditions of consciousness. In addition, this theory also attempts to give reductive explanation of consciousness based on physicalism. However, the higher-order theory and its main variants are facing many difficulties. More importantly, the physicalism-based reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness by the higher-order theory has been unsuccessful. The physicalism-based explanation cannot deal with the "homogeneity across the metaphysical scene" of consciousness, so it believes that consciousness is the original source of the phenomenon. It can neither give it reductive explanation. As Strawson put it, it can only be understood in a total interpretation.
作者 李忠伟
出处 《江苏行政学院学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第2期21-27,共7页 The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute
基金 华侨大学高层次人才科研启动费项目(12SKBS210)的阶段性成果
关键词 现象性意识 高阶理论 物理主义 表征 phenomenal consciousness higher-order theory physicalism representation
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参考文献14

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