上市公司监管中高薪养廉的制度设计缺陷

System designing defect of high salary against corruption under supervision in listed companies

针对近年来学者们提出"高薪养廉"的观点,本文从理论层面,通过建立委托——代理模型分析上市公司监管中"高薪养廉"的制度设计理念。在腐败和中小投资者利益随机负相关的前提下,研究发现,高薪对养廉的有效区间只限于中等水平的中小投资者利益区间,而对于高水平的中小投资者利益和低水平的中小投资者利益的实现,高薪并不能实现"养廉"的目的。因此,政策制定者要根据所追求的中小投资者利益区间来选择是否给予管理者高薪水,而一味盲目地提高管理者薪水,并不能达到政策希望的效果。

Regarding the opinion of high salary against corruption proposed by some scholars in the recent years, this paper builds a principal-agent model to analyze the system design of high salary against corruption under the supervision on the listed companies. On the premise of random negative correlation between corruption and interests of small investors, we discover the effective interval that high salad, can prevent the corruption is only limited to the average interests level of small investors. While to the lower and higher level of small investors＇ interests, high salary is ineffective. Therefore, policy makers should decide the salaries of the managers according to the interest interval of small investors. They may not attain the expected target by raising the salaries blindly.