沉淀投资、资产重组与企业所有权配置——兼论大型国企为什么不能简单私有化

Sunk Assets,Integration and Ownership Assignment of the Firm:A Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Reform

在新古典经济学中,一般均衡福利经济学定理和科斯定理都是以完全市场为假设前提,其中一个重要的隐含前提是市场的交易成本为零,亦即契约完全。然而,由于缔约或交易成本很高,很难预测所有可能出现的情况,契约是不完全的,专用性资产投资很容易产生敲竹杠问题,从而导致激励与协调不完全。因此,从契约不完全角度分析资产专用性投资与所有权配置具有重要意义。对于我国大型国有企业改革来说,简单地实行私有化并不是唯一的、首选的方案,而是需要在加大资产重组力度的同时,加强国有企业治理结构的改善。

The paper analyzes the governance structure or ow nership in terms of sunk assets. Based on the market transaction w ith asset specificity or sunk assets,the study show s that asset specificity has a great adverse effect on the governance structure and ow nership. Because of the existence of asset specificity in markets,they adversely influence the trading partners' behavior,leading to holdup problems. In principle w e provide the solutions to the underinvestment problems,i. e.,reduce or govern the amounts of sunk assets,and promote the factor mobility and governance structure,avoiding the holdup problems and investor loss. Under this condition the non-market governance structure is also necessary.