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创业导向企业的成长性:激励型与监督型公司治理的作用——基于中国创业板上市公司的实证研究 被引量:27

The Growth of Entrepreneurship-Oriented Firms:The Moderating Effect of Incentive-and Monitoring-Based Governance Mechanisms
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摘要 本文提出企业特性是决定公司治理机制治理效果的重要变量,并以2010—2012年中国创业板上市公司为样本,根据企业的研发与投资数据构造了创业导向程度的指标,实证检验了创业导向对企业成长性的直接效应,并考察了激励型、监督型公司治理机制对创业导向与企业成长性主效应的不对称调节作用。实证结果表明:(1)创业导向程度正向影响企业成长性;(2)针对高管的股权激励计划(股票期权、限制性股票和股票增值权)对创业导向企业成长性有正向调节作用;(3)以第一大股东持股比例和股权制衡度代表的监督机制对创业导向企业的成长性有抑制作用。本文的研究结果说明,在信息不对称程度高的创业导向企业,激励型与监督型公司治理机制对企业成长性有不同的作用方向,并讨论了这一研究结果的意义与启示。 Along with the quickening pace of technological innovation and customer tastes changing in the era of new economy, firms tend to adopt entrepreneurial strategic posture to face the challenge of global business competition so as to ensure survival and continuous growth. Entrepreneurship-oriented firms are characterized by innova- tive, proactive and risk-taking behaviors such as R&D investment, new market exploration etc. and therefore lead to higher extent of information asymmetry between managers and owners. What CG mechanisms should such firms implement to promote its growth and reduce agency cost.9 Although the deterring effects of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on the opportunism behaviors of top management teams in general are well-examined in previous papers, how entrepreneurship-oriented firms should utilize various internal and external CG mechanisms remains a question in the streams of CG literature and entrepreneurial orientation study. Therefore, in the study we posit that the feature of focal company is one of the determinants of effectiveness of corporate governance and further develop the hypothesis that incentive-and monitoring- based governance mechanisms have different moderating roles in entrepreneurial orientation and performance rela- tion. Based on the data of Chinese Growth Enterprise Market listed companies from 2010 to 2012, the study measure the extent of firm-level entrepreneurial orientation with the focal company's expenditure on RD and investment, and empirically examined the direct effect of entrepreneurial orientation on firm growth. Then we test the moderating effects of incentive-and monitoring-based governance mechanisms on firm growth respectively. The results show that : ( 1 ) the extent of finns' entrepreneurial orientation positively influences firm growth. ( 2 ) incentive-based mecha- nisms (equity incentives for TMT including stock option, restricted stocks and stock appreciation rights)play a positive role in enhancing the growth of entrepreneurship-oriented firms. ( 3 ) certain monitoring-based mechanisms, such as outsider blockholders and shareholding balance, play a negative role on firm growth. That is to say, monito- ring-based mechanisms hamper the advantage of innovativeness, proactiveness and risk- orientated firms. This may result from the high information asymmetry between managers and their mistrust and friction leading to inefficiency of decision-making and managing. taking in entrepreneurial and outside stakeholders The study makes the following theoretical contributions. Firstly, it complements the effectiveness of corporate governance and test the hypothesis that the effects of various corporate governance mechanisms are influenced by entrepreneurial orientation of focal company. Secondly, through the introduction of moderatin$ role of CG mecha- nisms, we further enrich the study of entrepreneurial orientation, offering inspiration to relative scholars. Moreover, the study provides insights to the moderating roles of different corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical test shows that for entrepreneurial orientation firms in which there exists high information asymmetry, incentive-based mechanisms have positive effects on organizational outcome while monitoring-based mechanisms have negative effects. Therefore the study is helpful to some extent in guiding the entrepreneurial orientated firms to choose appro- priate CG mechanisms according to its own entrepreneurial orientation extent and resource base. Despite the contribution to theory and practice, the study has its limitations and further research is required before generalizing the conclusion. The sample we choose is Chinese Growth Enterprise Market listed companies, which are mainly among high-tech industries. For them the input of R&D resources and other innovative, proactive and risk-taking behaviors have strategic significance in maintaining competitive advantages, which may not be the case in other industries. In addition, although we found support for the positive role of incentives in enhancing the growth of entrepreneurial oriented firms in the study, scholars have ever found that incentives may lead to manipula- tion of firm earnings or excessively risky decisions ( Kenneth, John &Derek, 2009).
作者 周萍 蔺楠
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第3期44-55,共12页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"新兴产业集群形成中公共风险资本和私人风险资本的合作机制研究"(71050003) 上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目"创业战略导向与企业成长性"(2014110472)
关键词 创业导向 激励型公司治理机制 监督型公司治理机制 成长性 entrepreneurial orientation incentive-based governance mechanisms monitoring-based govern- ance mechanisms firm growth
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参考文献35

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