政府投资审计引入中介机构的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Social Agent Introduced into the Government Investment Audit

大量的社会中介机构进入政府投资审计领域,有效地缓解了审计任务繁重与审计力量不足之间的矛盾但由于国家审计机关与社会中介机构有着本质的区别,他们之间存在着一种既紧密联系又相互制约和相互斗争的博弈关系审计机关委托社会中介进行投资项目审计,是典型的"委托—代理"关系通过构建审计机关和社会中介的"委托-代理"模型来分析双方的决策和行为,寻找双方利益的契合点和平衡点,既防止中介机构消极怠工和徇私舞弊,又能保证审计质量和提高审计效率,防范和降低审计风险,维护审计工作的公平和正义.

Using social audit resources is an efficient way to resolve the increasingly promi- nent contradiction between the heavy audit task and the lack of personnel. However, the government audit institutions and social audit institutions have the essential difference, it is a close relation and mutual restriction and mutual struggle of the game relationship ex- ists between them. This is the typical ＂principal-agency＂ relationship. By establishing the principal-agency model between government and social audit, this paper analyzed their se- lection and behavior. Finding an agreement and balance point of their benefit will prevent a go-slow and corruption attitude, improve the audit quality and efficiency, reduce the audit risk and ensure the audit work fairness and justice.