引入总部监督对内部资本市场效率的影响

Impact on Introducing Supervision of Headquarters on Internal Capital Market Efficiency

内部资本市场的运作效率在一定程度上决定了企业集团优势的发挥。企业总部依据分部经理提供的私人信息,通过内部资本市场(ICM)对资金进行重新配置,而利己的分部经理会利用自身的信息优势,通过实施机会主义行为干扰总部的配置决策,因此分部经理的这种异化行为是影响ICM配置效率的关键因素。已有文献的研究主要集中在总部如何设计对分部经理的激励机制上,而较少关注监督对分部经理投机行为的影响。本文引入总部监督机制,考虑分部经理情绪敏感性因素,建立总部监督与分部经理行为之间的博弈模型,认为总部监督可以降低信息租金的支付,部分替代激励功能;总部监督可能造成分部经理消极怠工和出工不出力等现象,导致资金产出折损,即存在"负激励"效应;"替代"效应、监督成本效应与"负激励"效应共同决定ICM效率。

The working efficiency of an internal capital market determines the play of the advantages of the enterprise group to a certain extent. The self-interested division managers may use their information superiority to disturbing the headquarters ' allocation decisions by implementing opportunistic behavior. Hence, this opportunistic behavior is the key factor which has impact on the efficiency of the internal capital market. The existingliteratures mainly focus on incentive mechanism pertaining to division managers while paying little attention to the impact of the headquarters ' supervision on opportunistic behavior. This paper introduces the headquarters 'supervision mechanism,considers the emotion sensitivity factor of division managers and establishes a behavior game model between the headquarters and the division managers.It is found that the supervision of the headquarters can reduce information rent and partially replace the function of the incentive. However, such supervision may have negative effect on division managers, which leads to slackness,low efficiency and the loss of capital production,namely the negative incentive effect. Therefore,replacement effect, supervision cost effect and negative incentive effect work together to determine the efficiency of internal capital market.